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Introduction 
Great things are expected of great countries. Certainly, in many ways China 
can already be considered a great country, and in other respects one could argue it is 
on its way to becoming one. What makes a country great? Population size, surface 
area, economic prowess or military strength? Or should we look at harder to measure 
and less tangible qualifications? We could argue a country is great if its people are 
guaranteed a large number of civil liberties, when they live in a harmonious society or 
where they simply are the happiest. In this thesis the focus is also on when things are 
not as great as they should be. Following the Arab Spring and its subsequent events, 
many civilians lost their lives in large-scale conflicts. Often these civilians were 
targeted by their own states, while these same states should in fact have a duty to 
protect their populations. This duty stems from the sovereignty of states, which 
creates a responsibility, i.e. “the responsibility to perform the tasks expected of an 
effective government” (Deng, et al., 1996, p. xviii). Does China also bear this 
responsibility because of its ‘greatness’? The acknowledgement of this responsibility 
or duty is a Western acknowledgment. In this thesis we will therefore apply a Western 
way-of-thinking in assuming that great countries will take responsibility. But what 
exactly is this responsibility and to whom do countries have a responsibility? The 
term ‘responsibility’ is usually considered to be a moral or legal obligation towards a 
person, thing, or task. The focus in this thesis is not only on the responsibility China 
has vis-à-vis Chinese citizens abroad, but also towards foreign citizens in foreign 
nations who are suffering state-sponsored abuse. Since there is no international legal 
framework in which states have a responsibility to act in defence of non-nationals, we 
consider the responsibility in this case to be a moral obligation. Especially from a 
Western point-of-view, it is a duty we expect great nations to fulfil.  
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The puzzle we are trying to solve is whether China is putting pragmatism 
ahead of principle. We will try to prove that China’s traditional non-interventionist 
foreign policy is untenable in a globalizing world. The economic reforms that started 
in 1978 have ushered in a new era that created an economic world order in which 
China is connected to almost every other nation in the world. The ‘going-out (走出去)’ 
policy launched in 2001 made it even more impossible for China to ignore events 
abroad. The concept of the responsibility to protect (R2P) and China’s view on this 
principle will be discussed in the first chapter. One of the things we expect from a 
great country is its active contribution to conflict resolution, to both domestic and 
international conflicts. China, first and foremost simply due to the size of its 
population and being the second economy in the world, is not exempt of these 
expectations. In the second chapter of this thesis we will therefore look at what China 
does to live up to these expectations. Special attention will be paid to China’s view on 
sovereignty, its role in the United Nations (Security Council) and its contribution to 
peacekeeping operations. Chapters 3 and 4 will be dedicated to respectively Libya and 
Syria, two war-torn nations that up until today still make daily headlines. They are 
prominent cases because they illustrate two different approaches by the Chinese 
government to – at first glance – similar issues. Traditional Chinese principles such 
as non-interference in other countries’ affairs are tested by events in the Middle East, 
simply due to the fact that China now more than ever is involved in these countries, 
especially economically. Globalization has linked China to states all over the world, 
making it increasingly difficult not to interfere. To sum up, the first part of this thesis 
will be a theoretical approach to the issues surrounding non-intervention. There we 
will illustrate how China’s foreign policy on this topic was constructed, and how it has 
changed. In the second part we will see confirmations from case studies that 
pragmatism is indeed gaining the upper hand over principle. 
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Chapter 1 - Responsibility to protect 
In this first chapter we will be discussing the concept of responsibility to 
protect (R2P). The notion of R2P could influence China’s foreign policy, so it is 
important to take an in-depth look at it. Firstly, we will look at an explanation of how 
the concept of R2P was constructed, how it developed over the years and in which 
ways it was applied within and outside of the UN. Secondly, we will specifically 
discuss China’s position on core principles of R2P and elaborate on the ways R2P has 
influenced the execution of China’s foreign policy.  
Evolution of R2P 
Deng et al. (1996, pp. xvii-xix) were the first to introduce an idea that links 
state rights with duties, birthing the notion of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’. It is this 
idea that rests at the basis of the concept of R2P, which was introduced by The 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 
December 2001. ICISS is a body established by the Canadian Government in 
September 2000 which aimed to reconcile the clash between intervention for the 
protection of human lives and a state’s sovereignty rights. More specifically, ICISS 
tries to “develop a global political consensus on how to move from polemics – and 
often paralysis – towards action within the international system, particularly through 
the United Nations” (International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty, 2001, p. 2). The concept of R2P has evolved out of dissatisfaction about 
the way the international community was unable to respond to “mass atrocity crimes 
in Rwanda and elsewhere in the 1990s” (Garwood-Gowers, 2012, p. 3). The release of 
the The Responsibility to Protect report in 2001 immediately incited numerous 
debates, eventually leading to a worldwide general acceptance of the norms 
introduced in the document. The main idea in the report released by ICISS was that 
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states have a responsibility vis-à-vis their citizens to protect them from serious abuse 
(such as mass murder, rape, starvation, etc.). When states are unwilling or unable to 
enforce this responsibility, this task falls upon other states, meaning that a need to 
intervene arises (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 
2001, p. VIII). The most revolutionary notion in the report is that it changes state 
sovereignty from “an absolute term of authority to a kind of responsibility” (Thakur, 
2006, p. 251). In the original 2001 report, R2P was based on three elements: the 
responsibility to prevent a population suffering egregious abuse, the responsibility to 
react if said crimes do occur, and the responsibility to rebuild after an intervention 
(International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 2001, p. XI). Four 
years later, at the 2005 World Summit, many heads of state and government 
accepted the concept of the responsibility to protect, and pledged to act according to 
its principles (UN General Assembly, 2005, p. 31).  
The three elements R2P was originally based on in the ICISS report were 
converted to three so-called pillars in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document 
(WSOD), which are: 
(1) The responsibility of the state to protect its population from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity, and from their 
incitement; (2) the commitment of the international community to assist 
states in meeting these obligations; and (3) the responsibility of member states 
to respond in a ‘timely and decisive manner’ when a state is manifestly failing 
to provide such protection (Luck, 2008, p. 1).   
The first pillar was already grounded in international law, while the second and third 
pillar increased the burden on state governments to wield their authority in such a 
way that is ensures its populations enjoy their deserved protection (Teitt, 2009, p. 
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211). So while especially the first pillar strengthens earlier created moral 
commitments, the second and particularly the third pillar have a more profound 
impact on the sovereignty of states. One of the key differences between R2P in the 
original ICISS report and the three pillars in the 2005 WSOD is the notion that 
military action, when it is required according to the third pillar, is only permitted in 
accordance with the existing UN Charter Chapter VII (Garwood-Gowers, 2012, p. 4). 
This chapter outlines that the authorization of military action is a tool available only 
to the Security Council, whereas the ICISS report also puts a degree of power in the 
hands of others. It permitted the use of force outside of the authority of the Security 
Council, stretching this right not only to the General Assembly, but also to regional 
organizations. It states that “[t]he Security Council has the ‘primary’ but not the sole 
or exclusive responsibility under the Charter for peace and security matters” 
(International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 2001, p. 48). The 
WSOD limited the scope of this responsibility to the Security Council only. China – as 
a permanent member of the UN Security Council – has an impact on the 
implementation of R2P and on the initiation of military interventions, as we will see 
further on. In April 2006, the World Summit’s commitments on R2P were reaffirmed 
in the Security Council in resolution 1674 (UN Security Council, 2006). This 
reaffirmation only succeeded because a link between R2P and military action was 
excluded from the resolution, a precondition that China – among others – insisted 
on. The core of resolution 1674 was a reiteration of paragraphs 138-40 of the 2005 
WSOD (Teitt, 2011, p. 304).  
R2P in practice 
In 2007, Ban Ki-moon pledged to strive to translate the concept of R2P ‘from 
words into deeds’ (Ki-moon, 2007). Applying the theoretical framework of R2P to 
THE LIMITS OF CHINA’S NON-INTERFERENCE POLICY 8 
 
actual humanitarian crises has proven to be a difficult task. In many cases since its 
introduction, R2P has been referred to in order to urge countries to get into action 
when grave threats to human life were present. However, its application has known 
varying degrees of successfulness, as some states argue that R2P can be abused as an 
imperialistic tool by (Western) governments to intervene in other countries’ domestic 
affairs. The first crisis for which R2P was specifically mentioned as a justification to 
intervene was in 2006 in Security Council resolution 1706 concerning the Darfur 
crisis. Although this resolution passed the UNSC with 12 votes in favour, two 
permanent members – China and Russia – abstained from voting. Another example 
where R2P was put forward was in the wake of Cyclone Nargis in May 2008. This 
tropical storm primarily hit Myanmar, resulting in an estimated 84,500 casualties 
and 53,800 persons disappearing. To date it is the second deadliest natural disaster 
in the region, with inadequate disaster relief operations often mentioned as an import 
factor aggravating this tragedy (Swiss Reinsurance Company Ltd., 2009, pp. 12-13). 
France’s Foreign Minister, Bernard Kouchner, argued that “Burma’s denial of access 
to cyclone victims constituted an R2P case because the deliberate massive suffering 
and death caused could be defined as crimes against humanity, which R2P is 
supposed to address” (Cohen, 2008). This attracted criticism from Indonesia, 
Vietnam, South Africa, and also China. They argued that the cyclone and its 
consequences were an internal matter and did not threaten international peace and 
stability, thus it was not necessary for the Security Council to intervene. They also 
pointed out that R2P should not apply to natural disasters. One final example in 
which R2P has been referenced is the Libyan Crisis. Multiple Security Council 
resolutions have been informed by R2P to legitimize intervention in an attempt to 
stabilize the region (see e.g. (Resolution 1970, 2011a; Resolution 1973, 2011b; 
Resolution 2016, 2011c; Resolution 2040, 2012a)). These resolutions and the Libyan 
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Crisis will be discussed in detail in chapter 3. Because the guidelines that emerged 
from the principle of R2P as it emerged from the 2005 World Summit are not clear 
enough, it is difficult to establish which circumstances legitimize the commencement 
of military interventions. Moreover, since the decision-making power on intervention 
now rests solely with the Security Council, situations may occur where the UNSC is 
unable to reach an agreement, and this may have a negative impact on already 
present humanitarian crises. 
Chinese view on R2P 
China is known to promote a policy of non-intervention in affairs of other 
states, so naturally you could expect it to look negatively at R2P. Surprisingly, China 
was part of the unanimous endorsement of R2P at the 2005 World Summit, and it 
also supported Security Council resolution 1674. In 2005, the Chinese Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MOFA) published a position paper on the United Nations reforms, in 
which it stated that: “When a massive humanitarian crisis occurs, it is the legitimate 
concern of the international community to ease and defuse the crisis” (Permanent 
Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN, 2005). In the same document, 
while it acknowledged that “each state shoulders the primary responsibility to protect 
its own population,” it also called for prudence in judging whether a government is 
able and willing to protect its citizens. Adding to this, the MOFA stated that reckless 
intervention should be avoided. So while China accepted the basic premises of R2P, it 
also maintains its cautious attitude towards intervention. In fact, some information 
about China’s foreign policy seems to contradict core aspects of R2P. One example is 
the ‘Five Principles for Peaceful Coexistence’, put forward by former premier Zhou 
Enlai:  
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(1) Mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; (2) mutual non-
aggression; (3) non-interference in each other’s internal affairs; (4) equality 
and mutual benefit; (5) peaceful coexistence (People's Daily Online, 2007).  
Another example can be found in China’s Independent Foreign Policy of Peace, in 
which it is stated that:  
All countries should settle their disputes and conflicts through peaceful 
consultations instead of resorting to force or the threat of force. No country 
should interfere in the internal affairs of another country under any pretext 
(Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN, 2003). 
These two examples seem to contradict two criteria of R2P: (1) the ‘under any pretext’ 
clause contradicts the provisions in UN resolution 1674 in which some crimes, such 
as genocide, war crimes and ethnic cleansing, do indeed provide a pretext for 
intervention; (2) resorting to force is deemed necessary based on R2P, whereas the 
Chinese foreign policy excludes the use of force as a legitimate course of action (Teitt, 
2009). How then, did the Chinese come to endorse the 2005 WSOD and let 
resolution 1674 pass through the UNSC? First of all, it is important to mention that, 
as Tiewa Liu (2012, p. 157), puts it: “[The] Chinese government supports the concept 
– not its whole theory – of Responsibility to Protect (…).” This indicates that China is 
not entirely unsupportive of the idea of R2P, but still holds some reservations. 
Moreover, Chinese scholars and experts also seem to have an internal disagreement 
on the topic. Some Chinese scholars fear R2P can be abused by Western powers to 
legitimize military intervention, while others see R2P as a bridge or solution to the 
conflict between the adherence to the non-intervention in other states’ affairs 
principle, and the need to intervene when grave threats to human life are present (Li 
B. , 2007).  
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The general attitude of the Chinese government towards intervention can be 
summed up in four characteristics. First of all, they stress the abovementioned 
importance of prudence in each matter, and emphasize that every crisis should be 
evaluated on a case by case basis. Secondly, peaceful means are preferred above 
resorting to the use of force. Thirdly, all humanitarian intervention action should be 
taken under the existing UN framework. Lastly, the opinion of the target state’s 
people should be taken into consideration and regional organization should be 
consulted (Liu T. , 2012, p. 162). These general observations all are of importance to 
China’s specific attitude towards R2P. The criterion that intervening actions should 
be taken under the UN framework (i.e. with the consent of the Security Council) is 
one of the main reasons China endorsed the 2005 WSOD. China’s insistence on 
Security Council control over R2P led to this provision being included in the 2005 
WSOD and the Chinese endorsement. This way China retained its power to veto any 
R2P action in the UNSC (Garwood-Gowers, 2012, p. 8). In the R2P evolution process 
China has engaged in what Prantl and Nakano (2011, p. 214) call ‘norm containment’. 
The Chinese government wanted a strict interpretation of R2P, limited to the key 
paragraphs of the WSOD. It was only because of this strict interpretation that China 
allowed resolution 1674 to be adopted. Even after the adoption of this resolution 
China’s attitude towards R2P remained cautious. In debates on the protection of 
civilians (POC) in armed conflicts in the Security Council China has voiced concerns 
about R2P on numerous occasions. Former Chinese ambassador to the UN, Liu 
Zhenmin (2006, pp. 7-8), remarked in December 2006 that: 
[T]he responsibility to civilians lies primarily with the Governments of the 
countries concerned. While the international community and other external 
parties can provide support and assistance (…), they should not infringe upon 
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the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the countries concerned, nor should 
they enforce intervention by circumventing the Governments of such 
countries.  
From this we can conclude that while China acknowledges that in certain cases 
outside involvement is necessary, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the states 
involved should still be respected. This seems to indicate that Beijing’s stance on the 
concept is somewhat paradoxical. Later, in June 2007, the Chinese ambassador even 
insisted that: 
[Since] there are still differing understandings and interpretations of this 
concept among Member States, the Security Council should refrain from 
invoking the concept of the responsibility to protect (Li J. , 2007, p. 17).  
If China endorsed the 2005 WSOD and voted in favour of UN resolution 1674, why 
then would they insist on refraining from invoking the concept of R2P? The focus of 
China’s foreign policy seems to lie on preventing humanitarian crises rather than 
responding to them. On several occasions, Chinese representatives have stressed the 
importance of providing conditions that prevent the outbreak of violence and possible 
mass atrocities. The first two pillars as mentioned in the 2005 WSOD indeed also are 
based on the preventive obligation of states. Apart from this special attention to the 
prevention of large scale loss of life, Chinese delegates in the UN have also 
emphasized the importance of the non-use of force. In July 2010 for instance, the 
Chinese delegate Wang Min noted that “adhering to the three principles of the 
consent of the country concerned, impartiality and the non-use of force except in self-
defence is the key to success of peacekeeping operations” (Wang M. , 2010, p. 28). 
While it is true that the three principles that Wang mentions are cornerstones of UN 
peacekeeping, Sarah Teitt (2011, p. 305) notes that the UN Principles and Guidelines 
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state that “force may be used in self-defence as well as the defence of the mandate.” 
So while China is making statements that are in the best interest of peacekeeping 
operations, pointing to the official guidelines and stating that only self-defence is a 
legitimate authorization for the use of force is a false justification. If the use of force is 
deemed inevitable to uphold the mandate, then member states are – according to UN 
regulations – legally permitted to apply it.  
So while in various instances China maintains a cautious attitude, in other 
POC debates China has actually reaffirmed its support for R2P. In a 2008 POC debate 
Liu Zhenmin reaffirmed China’s support for resolution 1674 by stating that “[it is] the 
legal framework within which the Security Council may address this issue” (Liu Z. , 
2008, p. 8). Other examples for Chinese support are its consistent contribution of 
military personnel to UN peacekeeping operations (UNPKO). An in-depth analysis of 
this aspect of Chinese involvement in UNPKO will follow in chapter 2.2. To sum up 
the Chinese attitude towards R2P a number of conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, 
China’s foreign policy is still grounded in the Five Principles for Peaceful 
Coexistence, which puts a heavy emphasis on the sovereignty of states and non-
interference. Secondly, China believes any decisions invoking R2P should be taken 
within the Security Council, which should be the only body that has decision-making 
power in these matters. The UNSC should look at each incident which possibly 
warrants intervention on a case-by-case basis. Thirdly, special emphasis should be 
put on the preventive functionality of R2P and peaceful intervention is preferred 
above the use of force. Lastly, China’s cautious attitude and reservations towards R2P 
are mostly rhetorical and not set in stone.  
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Chapter 2.1 - Sovereignty and non-intervention 
In this second chapter we will take a closer look at China’s (changing) stance 
vis-à-vis the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention. In chapter 1 we have 
already established that China’s strict adherence to these principles is one of the main 
reasons for its cautious attitude towards humanitarian intervention and R2P. We will 
now argue that adhering to the principle of non-interference in other states’ domestic 
affairs is limiting China’s capabilities to respond to international conflicts. In the first 
part of chapter 2 we will take a closer look at China’s commitment to these principles, 
and investigate whether its adherence to these principles has had an influence on its 
contribution to UNPKO. A detailed discussion of Chinese involvement in UNPKO will 
follow in the second part.  
Sovereignty and non-intervention 
Non-intervention stems from ancient China and as such is still rooted in Chinese 
society. We can trace non-intervention directly back to the concept of wuwei (无为) 
introduced by Laozi in the daodejing. Wuwei can be read as ‘non-action’ or ‘not-
doing’, and it is first mentioned in the phrase: “Wei wuwei, ze wu buzhi” (为无为，则
无不治) (Chinese Text Project, 2015). This phrase can be loosely translated as ‘Do 
not-doing, and there will be no disorder.’ This Taoist philosophy seems to still hold 
true and is applied to China’s foreign policy. We will look at non-intervention in a 
strict sense. This means no interference in other states’ affairs except on a diplomatic 
level and through debates. Non-interference prohibits military intervention, but also 
non-military intervention such as financials sanctions and travel bans on government 
officials. The first part of this chapter will proceed with Zhongying Pang’s findings 
that in modern China, the insistence to stick to a principle of non-interference is 
based on three grounds. In line with the general idea in this thesis in the back of our 
THE LIMITS OF CHINA’S NON-INTERFERENCE POLICY 15 
 
minds – that China is becoming a ‘great country’ – Pang (2009, p. 237) notes the 
following: “China has to balance its traditional commitment to ‘non-interference’ 
with its responsibilities as a great power.” Adhering to this traditional commitment is 
based on the following three grounds, each of which we will discuss in detail further 
on in this chapter: 
1. It is seen as defending China’s sovereignty from the ‘superpower threat’ and 
other foreign interferences into China’s sovereign affairs; 
2. The commitment to non-interference helps China create and maintain a deep 
political affinity with the wider developing world; 
3. Adherence to the principle of non-interference helps China to justify avoiding 
becoming involved in international crises that are not matters of Chinese 
national interest or in cases where it simply opposes international intervention 
on principled grounds (Pang, 2009, pp. 244-245). 
The ‘superpower threat’ 
‘Don’t do unto others what you don’t want others to do unto you. As you wish 
that others would do to you, do so to them.’ These two proverbs from Confucius and 
the Bible are at the core of China’s attitude towards interference into other states’ 
affairs. Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, China has 
had to deal with interference into its domestic affairs in many different fields. 
Whether it concerned human rights abuse, environmental pollution, or a lack of 
freedom of press, many – oftentimes Western – states have criticized China for its 
domestic policies. By promoting a stance of non-interference in other countries’ 
affairs, China hopes to create a weapon of soft power that prevents other states from 
interfering in their undertakings. This particular stance developed at a time when 
China experienced a (perceived) ‘superpower threat’, first from the United States and 
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later from the Soviet Union. During Maoist China the communist government 
believed the main threat to its sovereignty came from the United States and the U.S.-
allied states in Asia. Later, after the death of Mao in 1976 and the initiation of the 
Reform and Opening-up Policy (改革开放) by Deng Xiaoping, this threat was mainly 
perceived to be posed by the Soviet Union. In fact, while Deng’s reforms were mainly 
focused on the domestic economy, most of his foreign policy efforts were aimed at 
preventing the Soviet Union from “dominating China and otherwise intruding on 
China’s sovereignty” (Sutter, 2008, p. 38). At the same time, largely thanks to Deng’s 
reforms, China’s economy began to boom. As China became increasingly involved 
with the outside world in a positive way – through trade, diplomatic relations and 
exchanges on other levels – a policy of non-interference became less practical. 
Interestingly, as Gonzalez-Vincente (2015, pp. 208-209) points out, China’s 
acceptance into the UN as the sole representative for ‘China’ strengthened its ability 
to defend the idealistic principle of non-interference in its domestic affairs. So while 
its UN seat gave China a tool to promote non-interference and possibly gain more 
control over other states’ behaviour, “China’s socio-economic reforms represented an 
ideological turn to flexible and utilitarian pragmatism and away from Maoist 
dogmatic utopianism.” With China assuming a more dominant economic and 
political role, does it still have to defend itself from a ‘superpower threat’? Less so 
than in the Cold War era does China perceive a threat to come from one or two 
superpowers, but it still believes it is threatened. Verhoeven (2014, p. 67) remarks 
that in Communist Party’s eyes “liberal democracy threatens authoritarian regimes 
and that its export destabilizes international relations.” This threat does not only 
affect China, but also stability in other parts of the world. As such, the PRC blames 
Western-style liberal democracy for the unrest of the last two decades in Africa and 
the Middle East. Consequently, according to Xi Jinping, China’s assistance to Africa – 
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aimed at courting African states to engage with China rather than Western states – 
has ‘no political strings attached’ (Thomson Reuters, 2013). 
Affinity with the developing world 
Offering ‘assistance’ with no political strings attached is one of the ways China 
is attempting to get on the good side of other developing nations, especially in 
Southeast Asia, Latin America and Africa. The non-interference principle is a stance 
that many of these developing states have in common, which is oftentimes a product 
of bad experiences during a period of colonialization by Western states. In fear of 
neo-colonialism, these states all believe that non-interference in each other’s 
domestic affairs is an important principle for good international relations, as we will 
see below. One example of the importance these nations attach to non-interference 
can be found in the charter of the Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN): 
ASEAN and its Member States shall act in accordance with the following 
principles: (…) (e) non-interference in the internal affairs of ASEAN Member 
States; (f) respect for the right of every Member State to lead its national 
existence free from external interference, subversion and coercion (Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations, 2007, p. 6). 
BRICS, an organization for cooperation between Brazil, Russia, India, China and 
South-Africa, made a similar statement after its most recent summit in Ufa, Russia: 
We [BRICS countries] emphasize the central importance of the principles of 
international law enshrined in the UN Charter, particularly the political 
independence, territorial integrity and sovereign equality of states, non-
interference in internal affairs of other states and respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms (BRICS, 2015, p. 18). 
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The African Union (AU) has included similar acknowledgments in its Constitutive 
Act, albeit with more focus on objectives and duties vis-à-vis other AU member 
states: 
The objectives of the Union shall be to: (…) (b) defend the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity and independence of its Member States. The Union shall 
function in accordance with the following principles: (a) sovereign equality and 
interdependence among Member States of the Union; (…) (g) non-interference 
by any Member State in the internal affairs of another (African Union, 2000, 
pp. 5-7). 
The statements above are a testimony to the importance the member states of these 
regional organizations attach to upholding the principles of non-interference and 
sovereignty. Supporting the same principles helps China maintaining good 
diplomatic relations with these states. Although associating itself with the same 
rhetoric seems to be a sound strategic move by China, it is questionable whether in 
practice it is indeed showing its support for these values. In the second part of this 
chapter we will try to find an answer to this question, but first we will look at the third 
and last reason behind China’s commitment to the discussed principles.  
Avoiding involvement in matters not of Chinese national interest 
 Pang’s last argument for China’s adherence to the principle of non-interference 
in other states’ internal affairs is that China does not want to become involved in 
matters that are not of its national interest. This is a premise that holds true for many 
developing countries, and China is no exception. Simply speaking, domestic affairs 
have a higher priority in China’s (security) policy and thus the CCP commits more 
resources to trying to solve these matters. While every state in the world will put 
domestic affairs ahead of international affairs, for China this is a relatively difficult 
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task. China is a big country and shares a land border with fourteen countries and a 
sea border with another seven neighbours. By comparison, the mainland of the 
United States only has two direct neighbours over land (three, if we include Russia 
through Alaska) and six over maritime areas. Having this many neighbouring states 
resulted in China putting a higher priority on defending its national sovereignty. As 
Wang (2010, p. 14) notes:  
China has faced controversies and troubles that most other countries have not 
had to face. (…) It must be pointed out, however, that the main focus in 
safeguarding national sovereignty is to seek ‘stability’ and a ‘settlement’ in 
disputed areas, rather than to ‘cede’ or ‘seize’ territory. 
Considering the amount of resources China has to allocate to managing bilateral 
relations with all of its immediate neighbours, it is unsurprising that the Chinese 
government is somewhat reluctant to get involved in conflicts farther away from 
home. Nevertheless, in the last two to three decades – due to China’s increased 
involvement in international trade – foreign interests have become intertwined with 
national interests. Increased activity on the global market and an insatiable need for 
natural resources require China to increasingly look abroad and managing these 
foreign assets has become another priority in the CCP’s policy. The autarkic ideal as 
envisaged during the Mao era has become a thing of the past, and many Chinese 
companies – state-led or privately-owned – are doing business in other parts of the 
world. Some of these countries are politically less stable than others, and thus require 
more attention in order to maintain a healthy business environment. We can measure 
the increasing international activity of Chinese companies by looking at outward 
foreign direct investments (OFDI). China launched its going-out policy in 2001, and 
in 2012 it was the third largest outward investor, behind the United States and Japan. 
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Chinese OFDI flow reached US$ 84 billion in that year, of which three-quarters was 
generated by state-owned enterprises (Sauvant, 2013, p. 1). While Chinese OFDI 
stock increased from US$ 28 billion in 2000 to US$ 298 billion in 2010, this is still a 
relatively small amount for such a large country (compared to e.g. Singapore’s 
US$ 300 billion) (Robins, 2013, p. 526). Relevant to the discussion in this thesis is 
the destination of Chinese OFDI. While originally most of Chinese OFDI ended up in 
Asia, in recent years especially Africa has received a bigger share of total investments. 
If we exclude offshore financial centres, in 2013 around 14% of Chinese OFDI stock 
was located in Africa (Zhou & Leung, 2015). Does increased economic activity in 
Africa lead to more involvement in conflict management by the Chinese government? 
In the next section we will take a closer look at Chinese participation in UNPKO. 
Chapter 2.2 - Chinese participation in UNPKO 
 Since the PRC was granted a UN seat in 1971 in favour of the Republic of China 
(ROC), its diplomatic influence has increased steadily. The PRC took over the ROC’s 
seat as a permanent member of the Security Council, thus being able to veto 
resolutions. Originally, the PRC opposed all peacekeeping operations. In the first ten 
years since its admission to the UN three peacekeeping operations were established, 
in all of which China abstained from voting. From 1981 onwards, China’s attitude 
towards UNPKO became more supportive, and it dispatched a first batch of military 
observers to a UN force in 1990. Interestingly, as Fravel (1996, p. 1104) notes, China’s 
cooperation “resulted from changes in China’s domestic politics. Deng Xiaoping’s 
economic reforms, which were predicated on access to international trade and 
investment, required a more open and cooperative foreign policy.” Here we can 
identify a turning point where China started to pay more attention to multilateral 
relations, and participating in peacekeeping operations was a logical step in keeping 
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these relations healthy. So while Deng’s reform policy was hailed as initiating the 
economic upsurge of China, it also had a profound impact on different policies. All 
together this has led to the PRC currently being the largest personnel contributor to 
peacekeeping operations of the UNSC permanent members (Murray, 2013, p. 2). It is 
perhaps not entirely surprising that the start of China’s contributions to UNPKO was 
in 1990. The Tiananmen Square crisis of 1989 had a serious impact on China’s image, 
and its response to the student protests also led to sanctions by the United States and 
the European Community. Part of attempting to restore the nation’s image was not-
vetoing humanitarian interventions. As Allen Carson (2002, pp. 31-32) notes: 
[D]uring the 1990s, concerns about portraying China as a responsible, rising 
power, rather than a dissatisfied and irresponsible one, pushed the 
government in the direction of accepting limited cases of intervention as a 
symbol of the PRC’s benign intent within the international arena. (…) In other 
words, an interest in playing the role of “good citizen” on the international 
stage has led the Chinese to acquiesce to a series of interventions about which 
many in Beijing have real reservations. 
 This first mission for which China contributed personnel was the UN Truce 
Supervision Organisation (UNTSO), for which it applied to provide troops in 
November 1989. In 1990 Chinese military observers were actively deployed in this 
mission which was the UN’s first peacekeeping operation (created in 1948). Although 
this seems a watershed moment in China’s peacekeeping history, it only provided five 
participants (Reilly & Gill, 2000, p. 45). Indeed, in the first years of its participation 
in peacekeeping missions, China’s contribution remained minimal. In 2000 it 
contributed less than 1% of both the UN budget and the UN peacekeeping budget, a 
number that is disproportionate for a P5-member with 19% of the world population. 
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While in 2000 over 35,000 UN military personnel were involved in eighteen different 
peacekeeping missions, China only participated in five of these, and contributed only 
53 participants (Reilly & Gill, 2000, p. 43). Following the participation in UNTSO, in 
1992 China also endorsed the establishment of the UN Transitional Authority in 
Cambodia (UNTAC). While the UNTSO mission – as its name implies – was aimed at 
supervising the truce agreement in the Middle East, UNTAC directly infringed upon 
the sovereignty of the Cambodian state (Chen, 2009, p. 159). In fact, this is the first 
mission where China set aside its traditional adherence to the principles of 
sovereignty and non-interference, in favour of humanitarian intervention. China’s 
contribution to UNPKO has increased steadily ever since. As mentioned before, it is 
now the largest contributor of P5-members in terms of personnel. One last mission 
worth noting is the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization 
Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), created in July 2013. This is the first mission for which 
China provides infantry to protect other UN peacekeepers. In previous missions, 
China’s contribution was limited to observers, engineers and other supporting 
personnel, so providing fighting troops indicates another change in China’s UNPKO 
policy (Murray, 2013, p. 2). China’s commitment to peacekeeping operations can be 
seen as an indicator that China wants to be become a so-called ‘responsible 
superpower’. To conclude this section on UNPKO, there is another observation worth 
mentioning.  
 Besides creating an image as a country with an open-minded and cooperative 
attitude – a stance that could benefit international trade – there is also a different 
motivation behind Chinese participation in UNPKO. The Chinese People’s Liberation 
Army (PLA) is lacking in actual combat experience, therefore there is a benefit to 
participating in peacekeeping operations. As Richardson (2011, p. 291) notes: 
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Peacekeeping provides a means for China to gain operational experience in 
conflict zones, which is important for a military that has not deployed abroad 
since the Sino-Vietnamese War in 1979. Chinese peacekeepers work with new 
technologies, learn new skills and also gain experience of co-deploying with 
foreign militaries in complex missions in difficult environments.   
Training its military abroad also provides benefits to China’s domestic stability, as it 
provides China’s security forces with experience from ‘military operations other than 
war’. This experience may be applied to for instance riot-control at home (Bates & 
Huang, 2009, p. 16). While there are some obvious practical benefits to Chinese 
participation in UNPKO, there are many factors at play that determine China’s 
involvement in humanitarian interventions. The PRC’s motivations are not entirely 
clear-cut, and therefore in the next two chapters we will look at a dissection of two 
prominent cases in China’s international engagement history.  
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Chapter 3 – Case study Libya 
The two remaining chapters of this thesis will be dedicated to case studies of 
Libya and Syria. These will provide insight into Chinese activities in the region and 
contribute to a better understanding of Beijing’s policy decisions concerning 
peacekeeping and intervention. Recent developments in the area have had an impact 
on Chinese affairs and we will look at both countries in turn to determine how these 
developments have shaped China’s involvement in the region. Libya and Syria are 
relevant cases because they provide contrasting stories on Beijing’s foreign policy. 
Their prominence is also marked by the large-scale involvement of the international 
community. There are many other examples of countries where China’s policy has 
been shaped by pragmatism, but for this thesis the analysis will be limited to these 
two cases. Besides the contrast of the need to intervene in Libya and the adherence to 
non-intervention in Syria, we will also see that Beijing is ‘crossing the river by feeling 
the stones’. In other words, it is learning from earlier experiences and applying this to 
its policy in new cases. 
Chinese economic involvement in Libya 
Libya and China have maintained official diplomatic relations since 1978. 
Before the start of the Arab Spring, economic and trade cooperation between the two 
countries was mainly focused on three areas: natural resources; private trade; and 
large-scale construction projects. Oil – crude petroleum is China’s most imported 
good – is the major natural resource that China imports from Libya. In 2010 Libya 
was one of the ten top oil exporters for China, although in absolute amounts it was a 
relatively small player (Wang J. , 2012, pp. 37-38). Many Chinese construction 
companies are active in Libya, and their activities range from building roads and 
railways to constructing housing areas and university campuses. According to the 
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Chinese embassy, by the third quarter of 2010 China had invested a total of US$ 43.5 
million in Libya, with the bulk of the investments concentrated in the construction 
sector. Although trade relations between China and Libya are still relatively young, 
China already plays an important role in Libya’s trade economy. In 2009, it was 
Libya’s second largest trading partner, after the EU. In the third quarter of 2010 trade 
volumes between the two nations reached US$ 4.9 billion, an increase of 46.5% from 
the previous year (Afribiz, 2012). This increase was largely due to a growth of oil 
imports from Libya, at a time when Chinese overall crude petroleum imports were 
still greatly increasing. While China and Libya established increasing cooperation on 
different levels, there is some noticeable friction between the two countries as well. 
Beijing and Tripoli are vying for influence across the African continent, and Libyan 
officials were sceptical about China’s intentions in Africa. At the end of 2009, Libyan 
Foreign Minister Musa Kusa made a statement indicating that the Gaddafi 
administration was less than welcoming toward Chinese investments in the region: 
“When we look at the reality on the ground we find that there is something akin to a 
Chinese invasion of the African continent. This is something that brings to mind the 
effects that colonialism had on the African continent” (Hook & Dyer, 2011). Whether 
or not China’s leadership was worried about statements like these by the Libyan 
administration, in the end it did not matter much. The government was ousted and in 
October 2011 Muammar Gaddafi himself became a casualty of the Libyan civil war. 
The National Transitional Council (NTC) took over leadership in Libya, and this 
introduced a new player into the Sino-Libyan diplomatic relations. The impact of 
China’s initial support for Gaddafi on the relationship with the NTC will be discussed 
further on in this chapter. First, we will look at China’s role in the decision-making 
process in the UNSC regarding the Libyan civil war. 
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Libya in the UNSC 
China’s attitude in the UNSC concerning the Libyan civil war can be 
characterized as having both many similarities with earlier policies, as well as 
showing some signs of a new diplomatic approach. The first UNSC resolution on 
Libya was resolution 1970, which was adopted on 26 February 2011 and it entailed 
referral of the situation to the International Criminal Court (ICC), an arms embargo, 
travel bans for several members of the Libyan leadership as well as Muammar 
Gaddafi’s next of kin, and assets freezing (UN Security Council, 2011a). China’s 
traditional adherence to a policy of non-interference was challenged, but the 
resolution passed. Why did China decide not to veto this resolution which was in 
conflict with one of its most fundamental foreign policy principles? Since China often 
aligns its policy with the recommendations and wishes of regional organizations, one 
explanation is the support for the resolution by stakeholders such as the AU and the 
Arab League. Evidence for this can be found in a statement by former Chinese MOFA 
spokeswoman Jiang Yu, who stated:  
We should respect Libya’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and should 
promote a resolution of the crisis Libya is currently facing through dialogue 
and other peaceful means. The UNSC should pay close attention to and respect 
the opinions of Arab and African countries (Huanqiu Net, 2011). 
Aligning its policy stance with regional players seems to be a pragmatic approach, 
since China has a great interest in maintaining healthy diplomatic relations with 
countries in the region. China wants to offer those countries an alternative to Western 
investors, and as such is willing to loosen its adherence to traditional standpoints 
such as non-interference in other states’ affairs. We should not overestimate Chinese 
investments into Africa however.  China is Africa’s top trading partner, but it only 
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ranks seventh overall in FDI, trailing far behind the number one source of foreign 
investments, the United States. Since China is only recently actively engaging in 
outward FDI, this could change rapidly however. For instance, rising labour costs at 
home could spur Chinese companies to invest in manufacturing facilities in Africa’s 
low-wage countries (Olander & Van Staden, 2015).  
While supporting resolution 1970 indicated a shift in China’s intervention 
policy, adopting resolution 1973 had an even more profound impact on the situation 
in Libya. China abstained on the vote in the Security Council, effectively sanctioning 
the creation of a legal basis for NATO’s military intervention. resolution 1973, 
adopted on 17 March 2011, expanded the assets freeze, reinforced the arms embargo 
and – more importantly – it authorised the establishment of a no-fly zone in the 
airspace of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, in order to help protect civilians (UN 
Security Council, 2011b, pp. 3-5). The reasoning behind abstaining on the vote was in 
some respects similar to China’s decision to vote in favour of resolution 1970. Li 
Baodong, China’s ambassador to the UN at the time, gave the following explanation:  
China is seriously concerned over the worsening situation in Libya. We 
support the Security Council in taking appropriate and necessary action to 
stabilize the situation in Libya and put an end to the acts of violence against 
civilians at an early date. (…) China attaches great importance to the decision 
made by the 22-member Arab League on the establishment of a no-fly zone 
over Libya. We also attach great importance to the positions of African 
countries and the African Union (Permanent Mission of the People's Republic 
of China to the UN, 2011). 
Once again the Chinese delegation in the UN invoked the support of the Arab League 
and the AU as a justification for their decision. On the other hand, China was also 
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engaged in what Calabrese (2013, p. 11) calls a “diplomatic balancing act.” In fact, 
when providing the explanation mentioned above, the Chinese ambassador also 
expressed concerns that some elements of the resolution were unclear. In the same 
statement it was stressed that China always remains opposed to the use of force in 
international relations.  
While attempting to balance maintaining healthy diplomatic relations with 
regional players, and adhering to its own traditional policy, China put pragmatism 
ahead of principle. They came to regret this decision when the military campaign 
went much further than anticipated. One week after the resolution was passed 
Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Yang Jiechi expressed grave concerns about 
civilian casualties and called for an immediate ceasefire in Libya (Cruz-Del Rosario & 
Wang, 2011). Many regional organizations expressed similar concerns. Three days 
after the passing of the resolution, Secretary-General of the Arab League, Amr 
Moussa, “deplored the broad scope of the U.S.-European bombing campaign in Libya 
and said (…) that he would call a league meeting to reconsider Arab approval of the 
Western military intervention” (Cody, 2011). On a similar note, albeit somewhat later, 
the AU also voiced its dissatisfaction with the way resolution 1973 was being 
implemented. Its Peace and Security Council issued the following statement on April 
26: 
[The Peace and Security] Council stresses the need for all countries and 
organizations involved in the implementation of Security Council resolution 
1973 to act in a manner fully consistent with international legality and the 
resolution’s provisions, whose objective is solely to ensure the protection of the 
civilian population. Council urges all involved to refrain from actions, 
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including military operation targeting Libyan Senior Officials and socio-
economic infrastructure (African Union, 2011, p. 3). 
For the greater part, China relied on the assessment of the Arab League and the AU to 
decide not to veto the resolution. With hindsight, considering the consequences of the 
military intervention Beijing viewed this as a mistake. The scope of resolution 1973 
was surprisingly broad, leaving enough room for different interpretations. Paragraph 
four on the protection of civilians, which “authorizes member states (…) to take all 
necessary measures (…) to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat 
of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (…) (UN Security Council, 2011b, p. 3)”, in 
fact mandates the use of military force. The NATO-led mission Operation Unified 
Protector is generally considered to be a successful mission, but not due to the 
unanimous or ‘unified’ support for the operations in Libya. The lack of unanimity was 
for the greater part due to the differing interpretations of the mandate that resolution 
1973 provided (Van Geel, De Koster, & Osinga, 2013). Several non-NATO members 
joined the operation, including Arab League members Jordan, Qatar, and the UAE, 
but China was not one of them. China’s non-participation in this operation is not 
surprising. Not only was there a great reluctance on the Chinese side to let resolution 
1973 pass, but also proximity to the region would make it difficult for Chinese troops 
to provide any meaningful contribution. Furthermore, participation would be in 
conflict with Beijing’s view on settling disputes in a peaceful manner.  
Evacuation of Chinese nationals 
At the start of the U.S.-led intervention China’s interests in Libya were already 
somewhat diminished, which also might have added to a reduced degree of urgency 
regarding the crisis in Libya. At the start of the unrest in Libya, Beijing’s initial 
intention was to carry on with business as usual, but the crisis evolved in such a 
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manner, however, that this was made impossible. On 22 February 2011, President Hu 
Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao “ordered all-out efforts to safeguard the lives and 
property of Chinese nationals in Libya, asking authorities to take timely and effective 
measures” (Wu, 2011). Following this statement an operation was initiated to 
evacuate Chinese workers from Libya by land, sea and air. In total over 35,000 
evacuees were routed through neighbouring countries such as Tunisia and Egypt and 
flown to Malta and Greece, to eventually be transported back to China. Although 
exact figures are unclear, this presumably amounted to the evacuation of all Chinese 
nationals living and working in Libya. It had become clear that the Gaddafi 
administration was unable to protect the people living within its border, nationals or 
foreigners. This lack of protection for Chinese workers and assets added to the fact 
that Beijing was reluctant to protect Libya in the UN (Parello-Plesner & Duchâtel, 
2014, pp. 111-115). In previous instance we have seen that the Chinese leadership 
sometimes opts to shield authoritarian regimes, which was the case for Zimbabwe 
and Myanmar when China vetoed human rights violation resolutions (see e.g. (UN 
Security Council, 2008; UN Security Council, 2007)). In other cases, such as human 
rights abuse in North Korea, China attempted to prevent the Security Council from 
putting this topic on the agenda (see e.g. (UN Security Council, 2014)). The presence 
of relatively large numbers of Chinese nationals in Libya seems to have been one of 
the main reasons for Beijing to steer away from its traditional path of non-
interference. 
Current Sino-Libyan relations 
When it became clear that Gaddafi would not be able to defeat the opposition 
forces, the Chinese leadership had to make a decision to shift its support away from 
him and towards the new government of Libya, the NTC. The relations between 
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Beijing and the new regime in Tripoli were not off to a great start. Relatively strong 
ties with the Gaddafi administration before the start of the civil war made that the 
rebel leadership viewed China with suspicion. Moreover, the Chinese government 
was the last Security Council member to recognize the NTC as the sole legitimate 
power in Libya. The timing of this official recognition is no coincidence, since less 
than a week earlier reports surfaced that Chinese weapons manufacturers allegedly 
sold weapons to Colonel Gaddafi’s army. MOFA spokeswoman Jiang Yu stated the 
following on the subject: 
The Gaddafi regime sent representatives to China in July to meet individuals 
from relevant Chinese companies without the knowledge of Chinese 
government departments. (…) Chinese companies did not sign any military 
trade contracts with the Libyan side and certainly did not export any weapons 
to the Libyan side (Anderlini, 2011). 
What is important here to note is that these sales talks commenced after the signing 
of resolution 1970, which put an embargo on weapons trade with Libya. Moreover, all 
weapon manufacturers in China are state-owned companies, so it is unrealistic to 
claim that no governmental departments were aware of any negotiations. 
Abdulrahman Busin, a spokesman for the NTC, is certain weapon deliveries indeed 
have been made and that China acted in violation with the UN resolution:  
We found several documents that showed us orders, very large orders, of arms 
and ammunition specifically from China, and now we do know that some of 
the things that were on the list are here on the ground, and they came in over 
the last two to six months. (CNN, 2011). 
THE LIMITS OF CHINA’S NON-INTERFERENCE POLICY 32 
 
Busin added to this that NTC chairman Mustafa Abdul Jalil had “made it very clear 
that anybody who has helped and supported and stood by Gadhafi over the months 
would not be greeted well” (CNN, 2011).  
Supporting Gaddafi in the past and during the conflict would turn out to have 
economic repercussions for Chinese companies in Libya. A spokesperson for an oil 
company controlled by Libyan opposition forces stated that “because of their hostile 
stance towards the opposition, it would be difficult for countries like China, Russia 
and India to gain new oil exploration contracts. (…) On the other hand, the NTC will 
respect earlier contracts” (Liu Y. , 2011). Shortly after the Libyan rebels took control 
of most of the country, the sentiment towards China was hostile. Some stated that 
China “gambled on the wrong horse”, while others wanted to use the post-war period 
to “reward friendly nations and punish unfriendly ones.” China and Russia were 
characterized as “unfriendly” countries (Alexander, 2011). While these statements by 
NTC members and other rebels are quite unambiguous, pragmatism again prevailed. 
The arms sale was swept under the rug and trade between Libya and China continued 
as before. In fact, mutual feelings turned around quite quickly. On a visit to China in 
June 2012, Libyan Foreign Minister Ashour Ben Khayil praised China for its “fair and 
responsible position concerning Libya.” Then Vice-President Xi Jinping’s focus was 
more on economic benefits and promised that “China will encourage its companies to 
participate in Libya’s post-war reconstruction” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
People's Republic of China, 2012). Indeed, Sino-Libyan trade experienced a setback 
in 2011, but quickly recovered in 2012 (U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 
Commission, 2013). Most recent figures acknowledge the importance of the trade 
relation between Libya and China. China is the third export destination for Libyan 
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products (11% of total share), and after Italy (17%) China is the second country of 
origin for imported products (13%) (Observatory of Economic Complexity, 2015a).  
Lessons from Libya 
Shortly after abstaining on the vote on resolution 1973 Beijing already believed 
that this had been a policy error. What other lessons has China gained from the 
situation in Libya, which could have an influence on its foreign policy in the long run? 
Yun Sun (2012, p. 1) describes Beijing’s perception of the conflict in Libya as “gaining 
nothing while losing everything in Libya after abstaining on UNSCR 1973.” While 
China ostensibly did not gain much by abstaining on the vote, it is difficult to argue 
that it ‘lost everything’. As we have seen above, there was no long-lasting impact on 
Sino-Libyan trade relations. Moreover, refraining from vetoing both resolutions 
indicated to the West that China was willing to assume the role of a ‘responsible 
power’. Nevertheless, its experiences from Libya did have an impact on Beijing’s 
decision-making process during the Syrian civil war, which we will see in chapter 4. 
One important mistake China has made was its rigid support of Gaddafi, which lasted 
long after it was clear the rebel opposition would be the victorious party. Beijing 
should adopt a more flexible approach to similar diplomatic issues, which would 
make it easier to adapt to political changes. While the NTC has been eager to resume 
economic relations with China – also to their own benefit – in other cases a lack of 
diplomatic loyalty might hurt economic interests. It has been proven in Libya that 
non-interference is not feasible when both Chinese lives and other assets are being 
threatened.  
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Chapter 4 – Case study Syria 
In this last chapter we will take a look at Syria. At the time of writing events in 
Syria still make daily headlines and it has been a conflict-ridden area since the start 
of the civil war in early 2011. Millions of refugees have fled their country in the wake 
of the clash between government forces and the opposition. Later on in the conflict 
involvement of Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and its allied militias 
aggravated the situation even further. Most recent events include the commencement 
of Russian airstrikes in support of President Bashar al-Assad’s forces and an ever-
increasing stream of civilian refugees seeking asylum in Europe and elsewhere. In the 
first part of this chapter a brief introduction to the current situation in Syria is 
provided. Next, we will look at historical relations between Syria and China, 
specifically economic and diplomatic relations. Thirdly, we will discuss China’s 
position on Syria in the UN and its voting behaviour in Security Council resolutions 
regarding the civil war. We will also cover the dynamic between Moscow and Beijing, 
in light of Russia’s long-standing alliance with the Assad regime.  
Syrian civil war 
Before we discuss Chinese involvement in the conflict in Syria, it is important 
to provide a basic outline of the events in Syria. In March 2011 fourteen school 
children were arrested and reportedly tortured for writing the slogan “the people 
want the downfall of the regime” on a wall in the southern Syrian city of Deraa. This 
slogan had been used before in the uprisings of Tunisia and Egypt, and this was 
viewed as an act of rebellion by the Assad administration. Soon after, anti-
government protests erupted in other cities around the country, which was met with a 
violent crackdown by government forces. The conflict escalated even further by the 
rise of several jihadist groups, ISIL being the most prominent. President Assad 
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refused to step down, in spite of international pressure and several rounds of 
negotiations. Assad is still backed by his allies Russia and Iran, which adds to the 
complexity of the situation. The United States started supporting the opposition 
forces by providing them with different sorts of aid, including military intelligence 
and training. Partly due to the involvement of ISIL in the conflict, this attempt to 
topple the Assad regime failed. As part of the war on ISIL, a U.S.-led coalition began 
airstrikes in both Iraq and Syria. More recently, Russia has commenced military 
operations in the area as well. Allegedly, Russian forces are not only targeting ISIL 
jihadists, but are also attacking rebel forces in order to help President Assad maintain 
his foothold (The Guardian, 2015). In the meantime, the conflict continues to have a 
severe impact on the lives of the Syrian population. According to a UN-supported 
report (Syrian Center for Policy Research, 2015), in 2014 over 80% of Syrians lived in 
poverty, and over half of the Syrian population (around nine million people) was 
dislodged by the civil war.  
Sino-Syrian relations 
All politics is economics, and vice versa. Economic interests play a significant 
role in determining foreign policy. If a country has a large economic stake in an area 
where a crisis has erupted, there is a larger propensity that this country will come into 
action to protect these stakes. To acquire a better understanding of China’s policy 
decisions in Syria, we can start by looking at Sino-Syrian bilateral economic relations. 
Before the start of the civil war Syrian exports to China amounted to around US$ 90 
million. This is a relatively small amount, and only 0.74% of Syrian exports ended up 
in China. This means that in 2010 the total export value of Syrian products was 
approximately US$ 12 billion. When we look at Chinese exports to Syria, we discover 
that over 11% of imported products originated in China, representing a value of US$ 
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2.28 billion. This makes China the number one country of origin for products 
imported into Syria. Over 52% of Syrian exports consisted of non-crude petroleum 
and other petroleum oil related products. This does not mean however that China is 
heavily dependent on Syria for its oil imports. The top three crude petroleum 
suppliers for China in 2010 were Saudi Arabia (20% of total oil imports), Angola 
(18%) and Iran (9.5%). From this we can conclude that in terms of China’s energy 
security and economic impact Syria does not play a major role. When we look at 2013 
figures, we discover that the civil war has had a severe impact on the Syrian economy, 
and economic relations between Chinese and Syrian companies became even more 
insignificant. Syrian exports to China decreased by more than 95%. Compared to the 
all-time high of 2011 (US$ 2.42 billion), Chinese exports to Syria also dropped by 
more than 71% (Observatory of Economic Complexity, 2015b). So while China’s 
economic interests in Syria have suffered from the outbreak of the civil war, the 
stakes were not especially high.  
Other non-economic relations 
Diplomatic relations between Beijing and Damascus became more pronounced 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when China started to look more towards the 
Middle East after the end of the Cold War rivalry between the Soviet Union and the 
United States. In fact, Sino-Syrian negotiations and agreements of different sorts 
often involved the Soviet Union (and later Russia) in one way or another. As early as 
1969, the Syrians turned towards China to secure weapons deals, when they were not 
content with the delivery of Soviet arms supplies. At a time when Sino-Soviet 
relations were at a low point – due to the Zhenbao Island incident – this was 
considered to be a political move by the Syrians to coax Moscow into quicker arms 
deliveries (Mansfield, 1973, p. 480). The sale of weapons to the al-Assad leadership 
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continued well into the 21st century, and the Chinese state-owned company Norinco 
is suspected to have provided the Syrian government with chlorine, an ingredient that 
can be used in attacks with chemical weapons (Volodzko, 2015). After arms sales 
became less of an economic necessity, they still helped to increase Chinese influence 
in the region. Indeed, many Arab countries view increased Chinese influence in the 
region as a positive development, especially when contrasted with the (former) U.S. 
hegemony in the area (Zambelis & Gentry, 2008, p. 67). Moreover, China is viewed as 
an example of a successful political and economic development model, worthy of 
emulation. The Chinese model, or Beijing Consensus, is welcomed as a viable 
alternative to the traditional U.S. model. For Syria it is especially true that Beijing’s 
interests in the country do not have energy security at its core. As seen above, not 
only is oil trade between Syria and China limited, Syria’s oil reserves are also very 
modest when compared to other countries in the region. Syria’s close ties with Russia 
point us on our way towards understanding why Beijing takes such a special interest 
in the country. As we will see below – and as we have seen before – China repeatedly 
aligns its foreign policy with Moscow’s. In light of the most recent developments in 
Syria, the Sino-Russo-Syrian trilateral dynamic is one particularly worth exploring, 
and it may help us gain a better understanding of China’s stance on non-interference 
in this particular case. Firstly however, we will look at the proceedings in the UNSC 
regarding Syria.   
The Syrian case in the UNSC 
The Syria crisis was first discussed in the Security Council on 27 April 2011, 
during a briefing by Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Lynn Pascoe. The 
briefing described the anti-government demonstrations of mid-March and the violent 
response by the Syrian authorities. Pascoe also mentioned the promised reforms by 
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the Assad administration, which many Council members – including China – 
regarded as a positive development. The Chinese representative Li Baodong 
expressed the hope that “the international community will offer constructive help in 
line with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter” (UN Security 
Council, 2011d). This meeting took place little over a month after the adoption of 
resolution 1973 on Libya and the establishment of the no-fly zone. While much 
happened in Syria in the months following the briefing, in the Security Council 
surprisingly little happened. The first notable event occurred on 3 August 2011, when 
the President of the Security Council issued a statement  
condemning the widespread violations of human rights and the use of force 
against civilians by the Syrian authorities. The Security Council calls for an 
immediate end to all violence, (…) [and] calls on the Syrian authorities to fully 
respect human rights and to comply with their obligations under applicable 
international law (UN Security Council, 2011f). 
The first draft resolution on Syria, submitted by France, Germany, Portugal 
and the UK, was put to the vote on 4 October 2011. While the draft did not include 
any concrete measures to be taken against the Syrian government, it did hold the 
Assad administration accountable for mass atrocities committed against Syrian 
civilians. In previous versions of the draft resolution more specific wording regarding 
sanctions against Damascus was included, but this was left out in order to make the 
resolution more appealing to countries with a critical attitude toward foreign 
intervention. This strategy failed however, since both China and Russia cast their 
veto. The other three BRICS members – Brazil, India and South Africa – abstained on 
the vote, along with Lebanon. China and Russia had prepared their own version of a 
draft resolution, which could count on the support of the BRICS countries, but was 
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never put to a vote. Although Beijing and Moscow were united in their decision to 
veto, their motives were slightly different. In the debate following the veto, the 
Russian ambassador to the UN, Vitaly Churkin, explained that the rejection was 
based on their disagreement “with [the] unilateral, accusatory bent against 
Damascus.” Churkin also emphasized that Moscow was alarmed with “the weak 
wording in connection with the opposition and the lack of an appeal to them to 
distance themselves from extremists” (UN Security Council, 2011e, pp. 3-4). Russia’s 
position – as a close ally to President Assad – in this debate is not surprising. The 
Chinese representative, Li Baodong, was very brief in explaining the Chinese veto. Li 
made no mention of opposition forces, but merely repeated the ‘respect the 
sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity’ maxim (UN Security Council, 
2011e, p. 5). Russia and China both commented that their disagreement was based in 
part on the rejection of the threat of sanctions against the Syrian authorities, even 
though no mention was made of sanctions in the version of the draft resolution put to 
the vote. During the debate several mentions were also made of Libya and the 
similarities with the situation in Syria. Especially the Russian delegation expressed 
worries that the resolution would warrant an intervention similar to the intervention 
in Libya. The delegation of the United States refuted this allegation, stating that the 
resolution would not be a pretext to military intervention (UN Security Council, 
2011e, p. 8).   
 A second important development in the discussion of the Syria crisis within 
the Security Council occurred in January/February 2012. A new draft resolution on 
Syria was discussed and put to the vote. Important to note is that this draft was 
submitted by the Arab League and China’s negative vote can therefore be seen as a 
watershed moment in its foreign policy. The draft resolution contained similar 
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elements to the draft put forward in October 2011, but the demands toward the al-
Assad government were even stronger. The most essential provisions in the draft 
were that it demanded  
that the Syrian government immediately put an end to all human rights 
violations and attacks against those exercising their rights to freedom of 
expression. [The Security Council] demands that the Syrian government (…) 
withdraw all Syrian military and armed forces from cities and towns, [and] 
guarantee the freedom of peaceful demonstrations (UN Security Council, 
2012b, p. 2). 
Another important element of the draft was that it called for “unhindered access and 
movement for all relevant League of Arab States’ institutions”, essentially 
establishing a provision that could infringe on the sovereignty and territorial integrity 
of Syria. Most of all, the draft resolution created by the Arab League stressed the need 
for a political solution in Syria. The plan was to form a government of national unity, 
“with the participation of the current Government and opposition under an agreed 
leader” (The Council of the League of Arab States, 2012). The Chinese decision to veto 
the resolution can be considered remarkable for two reasons. First of all, the text of 
the Arab League resolution specifically states that “[The Council supports] efforts to 
end the Syrian crisis without foreign intervention.” Indeed, at the outset the Chinese 
delegation appeared to support the draft put forward by the Arab League, stating: 
“We support the League’s efforts to seek a political solution of the Syrian issue and to 
maintain stability in the region. We hope to see the success of its mediation efforts” 
(UN Security Council, 2012c, p. 25). Nevertheless, in the debate following the vetoes 
of China and the Russian Federation, ambassador Li expressed that 
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China maintains that under the current circumstances, to put undue emphasis 
on pressuring the Syrian Government for a prejudged result of the dialogue or 
to impose any solution will not help resolve the Syrian issue. Instead, that may 
further complicate the situation (UN Security Council, 2012d, p. 9). 
The shift in Beijing’s stance happened within less than a week, causing great 
indignation and disappointment towards the Sino-Russian camp by many of the 
supporters of the draft. U.S. ambassador Rice even stated that “any further bloodshed 
that flows will be on their hands” (BBC News, 2012). Ambassador Li once again 
repeated the importance Beijing adheres to the sovereignty, independence and 
territorial integrity of Syria, and by casting its veto China essentially ignored the non-
intervention clause provided in the text of the draft. A second aspect of the Chinese 
veto that is incongruent with earlier policy is the fact that Beijing did not align its 
stance with the regional institutions. The resolution was drafted by the Arab League, 
and from earlier examples we have seen – especially in the Libya crisis – that the 
direction of Chinese policy is heavily dependent on the position of regional 
organizations. Li claimed that China supports the efforts of the Arab League and that 
it viewed their initiative to start an inclusive political process positively. Nevertheless, 
Beijing decided to side with the Russian Federation and veto the draft. What has 
changed in the period between voting in favour and subsequently abstaining on 
resolutions regarding the crisis in Libya and the two vetoes on Syria? Disappointment 
with the developments of events in Libya could provide an answer. The decision to 
support the establishment of a no-fly zone over Libya was largely based on the 
backing of the Arab League for this measure. Only days after the no-fly zone was 
established Beijing called for an immediate ceasefire. While the Arab League itself 
was also fraught with disappointment over the far-reaching military intervention by 
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NATO forces, afterwards Beijing’s trust in the judgment of the Arab League 
leadership was damaged. On the other hand, we should not forget the many 
dissimilarities between the situation in Libya and Syria. President al-Assad is a close 
ally of Moscow, so Russia’s stake in Syria was much higher than in Libya. This has 
added to Beijing’s vehement support of the Russian Federation in the Security 
Council. While Chinese economic interests in Syria are negligible, this is not the case 
for Moscow. For instance, the proposed Qatar-Turkey gas pipeline running through 
Syria and connecting to the Nabucco pipeline (supplying Europe) is of importance to 
Russia. The Russian economy is heavily dependent on export of energy resources to 
Europe through Eastern Europe, which makes a Syrian pipeline a direct competitor 
to Russian companies. Keeping an allied regime in power in Syria is therefore a 
priority to the Russian leadership. The Chinese delegation in the UN appears to have 
acted in service of their allies in Moscow.  
Other resolutions on Syria 
The first (unanimously) adopted resolution on Syria was put to the vote on 14 
April 2012 during the 6751th meeting of the Security Council. Resolution 2042 
expressed the support for a six-point plan proposed by the UN-Arab League Special 
Envoy Kofi Annan. The plan entailed the establishment of a ceasefire, after which 
peace talks were to be commenced. On April 12 both government troops and 
opposition forces started observing the ceasefire. Two days later the adopted 
resolution approved the deployment of a small observer team to monitor the ceasefire 
(Adams, 2015, p. 12). Ambassador Li explained that China welcomed the deployment 
of the observer team and stressed the need for a political solution. Once again, Li 
reiterated the importance of respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
Syria (UN Security Council, 2012e, p. 4). Both China and Russia received a lot of 
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negative criticism after vetoing the October 2011 and February 2012 resolutions. This 
criticism may have a led to a more cooperative stance on resolution 2042. Of course, 
to China the deployment of an observer team was much more palpable than direct 
intervention by any (Western) country. It was a resolution with – as it turned out – 
relatively little consequences, aimed at seeking a political way out of the crisis in 
Syria. Beijing’s (changed) stance could also be attributed to the good – a more 
importantly neutral – reputation of Annan. Connected to the approval of the Annan 
plan was the adoption of resolution 2043 on 21 April, which established the United 
Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS). The Chinese delegation realized 
that the deployment of a UN force in Syria was an important condition to the success 
of the Annan plan, therefore decided not to cast their veto on this resolution either. 
Unfortunately, by the end of April many violations of the ceasefire were reported and 
both the Annan plan and UNSMIS were considered to be a failure. Many other 
briefings on Syria were held in the UNSC and several resolutions were passed. These 
resolutions almost always entailed humanitarian assistance to the Syrian population, 
and never involved accountability. Referring the Syrian government to the ICC failed 
owing to vetoes by both China and Russia. We can conclude that China’s stance on 
Syria has been relatively straight-forward. Beijing never endorsed any plan that 
would lead to an infringement of Syria’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. 
Moreover, it has always aligned its stance with Moscow’s, which has had a serious 
impact on the response of the international community to the ongoing crisis in Syria.   
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Conclusion 
By looking at two theoretical debates and two case studies, we have attempted 
to decide whether China is putting its principles aside in favour of pragmatism. 
Firstly, we discussed the responsibility to protect (R2P). Beijing was initially critical 
towards the concept, but endorsed it later. When the principle was called upon for a 
humanitarian intervention in Myanmar, China resisted nonetheless. The Chinese 
leadership’s main problem with R2P is that they believe it is unclear what can be seen 
as a valid R2P-case. The power over R2P is rested in the Security Council, giving 
China full control over policy. We can conclude that Beijing supports the concept of 
R2P, but not the whole theory. Moreover, the Chinese emphasis has always been on 
prevention rather than intervention. Some cornerstones of China’s current foreign 
policy still contradict R2P. In the second chapter we examined China’s critical 
attitude towards sovereignty and non-intervention even further. Adhering to non-
intervention gives China a weapon of soft power to prevent other states interfering in 
Chinese affairs. Beijing believes interfering will often do more harm than good, and 
as such they blame Western-led democracy promoting actions for the unrest in large 
parts of the world. Many regional organizations attach a great deal of importance to 
non-interference, and we have seen that China often aligns its policy with these 
groups. The PRC’s conservative stance is aimed at avoiding involvement in matters 
that are not of national interest. This becomes increasingly difficult due to increased 
international trade and growing interests in all areas of the globe. When we look at 
UN-led peacekeeping operations, we see that China’s stance has shifted. At first 
China took no part in these operations, but today it is the largest personnel 
contributor of P5 members. From this we can conclude that humanitarian 
intervention is gaining ground over adhering to traditional principles. More military 
experience for the PLA is an added bonus. 
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 In chapters 3 and 4 we applied the theoretical elements to the crises in Libya 
and Syria. Libya and China are competing for influence on the African continent. At 
the same time, Libyans are inviting Chinese companies to invest in their country, 
mainly in construction and petrochemical industries. China abstained on or even 
endorsed resolutions on Libya, seeking to adjust its foreign policy to regional 
organizations’ recommendations. Beijing sought to find a middle ground between the 
interests of regional players and traditional non-interference policy. In retrospect, 
endorsing resolution 1973 was a mistake in Beijing’s eyes. The military intervention 
went too far. Chinese nationals under threat in Libya forced the CCP to conduct a 
self-governed evacuation operation. Some economic damage was caused by this, and 
support for Gaddafi also did not help China’s future position in Libya. Nevertheless, 
pragmatism prevailed and Sino-Libyan trade rebounded. China acted as a 
‘responsible power’ by refraining from casting its veto on the UN resolutions. Beijing 
was cautious not to make the same mistakes in Syria. While China was economically 
important for Syria, this was not the case vice versa. Syria is no major source country 
for Chinese crude petroleum imports. After the start of the conflict bilateral trade has 
dwindled. Weapons trade gave China an inroads into the Middle East, consequently 
increasing its influence in the region. UNSC proceedings on Syria were off to a slow 
start. The first draft resolution on Syria, placing accountability with Assad for mass 
atrocity crimes, was vetoed by China and Russia. The second draft, put forward by the 
Arab League, was in the end also vetoed by the PRC and the Russian Federation. 
China opted to support Moscow in favour of a regional organization. It chose to 
strengthen diplomatic ties with Russia, which also reinforced their traditional non-
interference views. In this case pragmatism went hand-in-hand with principle. The 
stakes for China in Syria were not especially high, therefore non-interference was a 
viable policy stance. We will have to see how Beijing will react to increased Russian 
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involvement in the area. Moreover, recently Chinese nationals have become victims 
of abductions and executions in the region. Will the wuwei-principle be able to stand 
against groups such as ISIL, or is the time to intervene near at hand? From the 
research above, we have established that China’s traditional non-interventionist 
foreign policy is increasingly untenable in a globalizing world. Eventually, principle 
will fall to pragmatism.  
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